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2002 SYMPOSIUM UPDATE
MEDIA LIABILITY FOR VIOLENT CONDUCT:
ONE YEAR LATER
Clay Calvert*
I. INTRODUCTION
A major subject of debate in February 2002 at the Fourth Annual
Entertainment Law Symposium-"Tune In, Turn On, Cop Out?: The
Media and Social Responsibility"-was the media's liability for violent
audience behavior.' A number of high-profile cases in which media
products were blamed for causing violence-among them songs by the
metal group Slayer2 and the late rapper Tupac Shakur,3 a movie produced
* Associate Professor of Communications & Law, Associate Dean of the Schreyer Honors
College, and Co-Director of the Pennsylvania Center for the First Amendment at The
Pennsylvania State University. B.A., Communication, Stanford University, 1987; J.D. (Order of
the Coif), 1991, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; Ph.D., 1996,
Communication, Stanford University. Member, State Bar of California. The author thanks Kim
Tranell of the Schreyer Honors College at The Pennsylvania State University for her research and
editing related to this article.
1. See Rex S. Heinke, A Hypothetical: Potential Liability Arising from the Dissemination of
Violent Music, 22 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 233 (2002); F. Jay Dougherty et al., A Panel
Discussion: Potential Liability Arising from the Dissemination of Violent Music, 22 LOY. L.A.
ENT. L. REv. 237 (2002); Rodney A. Smolla, From Hit Man to Encyclopedia of Jihad: How to
Distinguish Freedom of Speech from Terrorist Training, 22 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 479 (2002).
2. Pahler v. Slayer, 29 Media L. Rep. 2627 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2001). See Slayer Ruled Not
Liable in Slaying, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 1, 2001, Features at 44 (describing a California Superior
Court judge's finding that the band Slayer could not be held civilly liable for the murder of a 15-
year-old girl, Elyse Pahler, by three boys who listened to the band's music and claimed it
instructed them to kill her as a virgin sacrifice). See generally Clay Calvert, Framing and
Blaming in the Culture Wars: Marketing Murder or Selling Speech?, 3 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC.
128 (2001) (analyzing Pahler and a previous trial court ruling in it).
According to one article published after the October 2001 ruling in favor of Slayer, the
then-recently released God Hates Us All still contains "chilling images" and is "harder and
thicker," despite the lawsuit that was filed against it. Joe Ehrbar, Gentle Killer-Metal Show Is
Still a Slayer, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 30, 2001, at 7.
3. See Davidson v. Time Warner, 25 Media L. Rep. 1705 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
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by Oliver Stone, 4 and a book describing how to be a hit man 5-provided
ample legal fodder, along with a hypothetical drafted by media defense
attorney Rex Heinke,6 for that discourse.7
One year now has passed since that discussion, but the topic clearly
has not faded from either the public view or the legal limelight. Violent
video games, in fact, were initially a focus of blame in the series of sniper
shootings that left ten people dead8 in Maryland and Virginia in October
2002.9 Wal-Mart stores actually removed sniper video games from their
shelves. l Newspapers ran feature stories on the possible connection
between video games and violence." The shootings thus once again, as
with other recent incidents of violence, 12 turned the journalistic spotlight on
media products as a source of blame for societal violence.'
3
4. See Byers v. Edmondson, 712 So. 2d 681 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
5. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S.
1074 (1998).
6. Heinke, supra note 1.
7. See Dougherty, supra note 1, at 243-56 (addressing each of these cases in the context of a
panel discussion that featured attorneys Rex S. Heinke, Frank J. Janacek, Jr., and Zazi Pope, and
Professors F. Jay Dougherty, Loyola Law School, and Rodney A. Smolla, University of
Richmond, T.C. Williams School of Law).
8. See generally Francis X. Clines, End to 3 Weeks of Terror for the Capital, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 25, 2002, at Al (describing the "harrowing, three-week ordeal" in the "Washington
metropolitan region").
9. Derrick Bartlett, president of the American Sniper Association, said the killers could have
learned their skills from "any video arcade," adding that some of the games "could desensitize
you to the idea of killing a human being." Darragh Johnson & Michael E. Ruane, Residents'
Theories Run Gamut, Video Game Devotee, Terrorist Among Guesses, WASH. POST, Oct. 9,
2002, at Al5. See Howard Kurtz, The Case with No Easy Answers, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2002,
at Cl (noting how one private investigator made the rounds of several networks speculating that
the perpetrators were "most likely short men in their twenties who like to play 'stupid video
games. '").
Video game enthusiasts, in contrast, "were despairing of yet another rush to blame violent
games for actual violence, saying many dispute any link between games like Sniper and actual
snipers." Kate Zemike, Experts Debate the Sniper's Links to Popular Culture, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
11, 2002, at A26.
10. Leslie Gray Streeter, Running Scared, PALM BEACH POST, Oct. 23, 2002, at ID.
11. See generally Chip Carter, Vice, Violence & Video Games, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Oct. 14, 2002, at 1 E (discussing, during the time period when the sniper shootings were taking
place, the connection between video games and real-life violence); Marlon Manuel, As D.C. Toll
Mounts, Criticism of Sniper Games Rises, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 21, 2002, at IC
(describing various "first-person shooting" video games and noting that psychologists and others
are "speculating about a possible connection between video games and school shootings").
12. See generally Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, The Irony of News Coverage: How
the Media Harm Their Own First Amendment Rights, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 215, 226
(2002) (describing "the news media's focus after Columbine on media products as a source of
blame for such schoolhouse violence").
13. See generally Bob Herbert, Saturated with Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2002, at A31
2003] SYMPOSIUM UPDATE: MEDIA LIABILITY FOR VIOLENT CONDUCT 249
While video games did not always fare well in the courts since the
February 2002 symposium against local ordinances designed to restrict
minors' access to them-a federal district court in Missouri held in April
2002 that video games are not a form of expression protected by the First
Amendment14 guarantee of free speech' 5-the tide of judicial opinions in
the past year has risen up against holding the media civilly liable for real-
life violence caused by a slew of products, including video games, movies,
television talk shows, and Internet Web sites.1 6 These cases are described
briefly in the next part of this article.
II. THE CASES
Four pro-media, pro-First Amendment opinions issued subsequent to
last year's symposium are illustrative of the tide of cases mentioned above.
They are, in chronological order:
1. The March 4, 2002 ruling by a federal district court in Colorado
dismissing negligence and products liability claims filed by the widow and
stepchildren of a teacher killed at Columbine High School in April 1999.
(writing about the sniper shootings and observing that "[i]n the popular culture of movies,
television and video games, murder is such a staple we seldom give it a second thought"); Tatsha
Robertson, Sniper Attacks Bring Scrutiny to Pursuit of Marksmanship, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 28,
2002, at Al (citing "critics" who "say the glorification of powerful military weapons and rock
star-like admiration of military snipers, as well as video games and movies about lonesome but
brilliant long-range killers, all lead to the possibility of more incidents like that in Washington
and the chilling shootings at Columbine High School") (emphasis added).
14. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part that
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses have been incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to apply to state and local government entities and
officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
15. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1135
(E.D. Mo. 2002) (upholding a St. Louis, Missouri County ordinance restricting minors' access to
the sale, rental, and use of violent video games, and finding that "the plaintiffs failed to meet their
burden of showing that video games are a protected form of speech under the First Amendment").
Judge Stephen Limbaugh later affirmed his initial opinion in June 2002. Interactive Digital
Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13600 (E.D. Mo. June 14, 2002). See
Peter Shinkle & Phil Sutin, Ruling Clears Way for Law Requiring Parental Consent for Some
Video Games, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 18, 2002, at B 1 (describing the St. Louis County
ordinance and the legal battle surrounding it).
Judge Limbaugh's decisions, however, contrast starkly with the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals' ruling in March 2001 that struck down a similar Indianapolis, Indiana ordinance. Am.
Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 578 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
994 (2001). See generally Clay Calvert, Violence, Video Games and a Voice of Reason: Judge
Posner to the Defense of Kids' Culture and the First Amendment, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2002)
(praising the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion in Kendrick).
16. See discussion infra Part II.
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The long list of media defendants included the producers and distributors of
both a movie called The Basketball Diaries, as well as several video games
including Mortal Kombat and Doom;
17
2. The March 27, 2002 ruling by a federal district court in
Connecticut dismissing product liability, unfair trade practices, and
emotional distress claims filed by the mother of a boy who was stabbed to
death with a kitchen knife by another youth who allegedly was obsessed
with the video game Mortal Kombat;1
8
3. The August 13, 2002 opinion by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upholding a district court's decision to
dismiss causes of action for negligence and products liability filed against
several video game, movie production, and Internet content-provider firms
by the parents of children killed in a school shooting in Paducah, Kentucky,
in December 1997;19 and
4. The October 22, 2002 ruling by a Michigan appellate court
reversing a $29 million jury verdict against the Jenny Jones Show, its
producer, and its owner, in favor of the estate of Scott Amedure. Amedure
was killed by a man who was allegedly humiliated on the television show
by Amedure's "ambush ' 0 revelation that he had a secret crush on him.2'
Three questions readily come to mind: 1) Are there similarities and
patterns, besides the obvious pro-defense outcomes, between the judicial
analyses in these cases?; 2) Do the cases send a clear signal to plaintiffs'
attorneys that the future of litigation against the manufacturers and
producers of media products is bleak?; and 3) Were there any silver-linings
for plaintiffs in any of these opinions? Each of these questions is addressed
in subsequent parts of this article.
III. THE PATTERNS
With regard to the first question posed above, about the similarities in
the judicial analyses, some clear patterns seem to emerge from the
aforementioned quartet of cases. They are:
1. Negligence causes of action are likely to fail on the questions of
17. Sanders v. Acclaim Entm't., Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Colo. 2002).
18. Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D. Conn. 2002).
19. James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002).
20. See CLAY CALVERT, VOYEUR NATION 65 (Herbert I. Schiller ed., 2000). "[T]he
voyeurism of tell-all talk shows also plays to the 'moment of truth' attraction. A common
technique that embodies this concept is the so-called ambush episode in which one guest surprises
and confronts another with a startling revelation or announcement that previously had been kept
secret." Id. (calling the Amedure incident "a classic example of the ambush technique").
21. Graves v. Warner Bros., 656 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).
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both duty
2 2 and causation.
23
2. Products liability causes of action are likely to fail on the grounds
that video games, movies, and Internet sites are not "products" for purposes
of strict liability. 24 As the judge in the Columbine-based lawsuit opined,
"intangible thoughts, ideas, and expressive content are not 'products' as
contemplated by the strict liability doctrine. 25 Unless a video cassette or
video game cartridge actually were to explode and thereby injure its user,
no claim for products liability would exist.
26
3. The incitement-to-violence standard laid down by the United
States Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio27 more than thirty years ago
still 28 provides a solid First Amendment bulwark against tort liability for
22. See James v. Meow Media, 300 F.3d 683, 700 (6th Cir. 2002) (writing that "[w]e ...
have determined that the defendants did not owe a duty [of care] to protect the decedants [sic]");
Sanders v. Acclaim Entm't, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1275 (D. Colo. 2002) (holding "that the Video
Game and Movie Defendants owed no duty to Plaintiffs as a matter of law"); Graves v. Warner
Bros., 656 N.W.2d 195, 203 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (holding there was a "lack of duty, an
essential element of any negligence cause of action" owed by the defendants).
23. See James, 300 F.3d at 699-700 (writing that "the idiosyncratic nature of Cameal's
reaction to the defendants' media would likely compel us to hold that this action constitutes a
superseding cause" and thus making it likely that the plaintiffs "have not alleged sufficient facts
to establish the third element of a prima facie tort case: proximate causation"); Sanders, 188 F.
Supp. 2d at 1276 (finding that the intentional violent acts of Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold at
Columbine High School "were the superseding cause of Mr. Sanders' death" and thus the
defendants "were not a proximate cause of Mr. Sanders' injuries").
24. James, 300 F.3d at 700-01 (holding that "[t]he video game cartridges, movie cassette,
and internet transmissions are not sufficiently 'tangible' to constitute products in the sense of
their communicative content"); Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 174 (D.
Conn. 2002) (concluding that the video game at issue in the case "cannot be a product within the
ambit" of the relevant Connecticut Product Liability Act because it is not sufficiently
distinguishable from motion pictures).
25. Sanders, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1279.
26. See James, 300 F.3d at 701 (writing that "[c]ertainly if a video cassette exploded and
injured its user, we would hold it a 'product' and its producer strictly liable for the user's physical
damages").
27. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that the government cannot forbid even the advocacy
of force or illegal action "except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action'""). See generally
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 13-55 (1999)
(providing a summary, including case excerpts, of the development of the incitement
jurisprudence under the First Amendment).
28. The word "still" is used because Brandenburg proved an effective defense tool in cases
now more than a decade old in which plaintiffs sought to impose liability on media products for
allegedly causing real-life violence. See Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1022-
23 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying the Brandenburg standard to preclude liability in case involving a
boy who died while imitating an act described in Hustler magazine); Olivia N. v. NBC, 178 Cal.
Rptr. 888, 892 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (concluding that Brandenburg was the correct standard to
apply, rather than negligence, and holding that it precluded liability in a case involving a group of
boys who allegedly imitated an act of sexual assault they saw on a television movie).
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the media.29
While an in-depth analysis of these three patterns is beyond the scope
of this update article, the first pattern regarding the failure of negligence
claims bears further analysis here. In three cases involving traditional
negligence theories-the Columbine school shooting case of Sanders v.
Acclaim Entertainment, Inc. ,30 the Paducah school shooting case of James
v. Meow Media, Inc. ,3 and the Jenny Jones Show case of Graves v. Warner
Bros. 32-the courts performed extensive duty-of-care analyses 33 before
each rejected the imposition of a duty on the respective media defendants.
Without a legal duty of care, of course, a claim for negligence must
necessarily fail.
In Sanders, the district court weighed four factors in its duty analysis:
"1) foreseeability of the injury or harm that occurred; 2) the social utility of
Defendants' conduct; 3) the magnitude of the burden of guarding against
the injury or harm; and 4) the consequences of placing the burden on the
Defendants. 34  Judge Lewis T. Babcock concluded that each factor
militated against finding a duty of care owed by the media defendants.
On the first factor of foreseeability, he wrote that the media
defendants had no reason to suppose that the two boys who did the
shootings at Columbine, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, "would decide to
murder or injure their fellow classmates and teachers. 35 He added that
while the defendants "might have speculated that their motion picture or
video games had the potential to stimulate an idiosyncratic reaction in the
mind of some disturbed individuals, ' 36 such a speculative possibility does
29. See James, 300 F.3d at 698 (concluding that "[t]he violent material in the video games
and The Basketball Diaries falls well short" of the Brandenburg threshold); Sanders, 188 F.
Supp. 2d at 1281 (writing that "Brandenburg remains the applicable standard even where the
individual allegedly incited to commit unlawful acts is a minor" and concluding that the plaintiffs
in Sanders "cannot, as a matter of law, demonstrate that the video games and movie were 'likely'
to cause any harm, let alone imminent lawless action"); Wilson, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 182 (writing
that "[a]pplying Brandenburg to the facts Wilson alleges, she cannot prevail").
30. 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Colo. 2002).
31. 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002).
32. 656 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).
33. Under the Colorado law applicable in Sanders, a plaintiff suing for negligence "must
establish: 1) the existence of a legal duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant; 2) breach of the
duty; 3) injury to the plaintiff, and 4) actual and proximate causation." Sanders, 188 F. Supp. 2d
at 1271 (emphasis added). Likewise, under the Kentucky principles of negligence applicable in
James, "the plaintiff must establish that the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, that the
defendant breached the duty of care, and that the defendant's breach was the proximate cause of
the plaintiff's damages." James, 300 F.3d at 689 (emphasis added).
34. Sanders, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1271.
35. Id. at 1272.
36. Id.
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not create a legal duty of care.3 7 There was, for Judge Babcock, "no basis
for determining that violence would be considered the likely consequence
of exposure to video games or movies. ' 38
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in James also considered
foreseeability in its duty analysis and, like Judge Babcock in Sanders, held
that this factor militated against imposing a duty of care by media
defendants to prevent the school shootings carried out by then fourteen-
year-old Michael Carneal. 39 The court of appeals reasoned that it was "too
far a leap from shooting characters on a video screen (an activity
undertaken by millions) to shooting people in a classroom (an activity
undertaken by a handful, at most) for Carneal's actions to have been
reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturers of the media that Carneal
played and viewed."4
And in Graves, the Michigan appellate court wrote that, in the context
of establishing a duty to prevent criminal conduct committed by another,
"[a]ny duty is limited to reasonably responding to situations occurring on
the premises and pose a risk of imminent and foreseeable harm to
identifiable invitees[.] '41 In that case, however, the majority wrote that the
defendants "had no duty to anticipate and prevent the act of murder
committed by Schmitz three days after leaving defendants' studio and
hundreds of miles away. '' 2 In brief, the act was neither imminent nor
foreseeable.
Beyond failure on the question of foreseeability in the duty analysis
of these courts, other factors militated against the imposition of a duty of
care. The social utility factor noted above 4 3 weighed against finding a duty
in Sanders. The judge in that case emphasized that "there is social utility in
expressive and imaginative forms of entertainment even if they contain
violence."" Similarly, the federal appellate court in James noted that
"[a]ttaching tort liability to the ideas and images conveyed by the video
games, the movie, and the internet sites.., raises grave constitutional
concerns that provide yet an additional policy reason not to impose a duty
of care between the defendants and the victims in this case."45  The
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1273.
39. James, 300 F.3d at 691.
40. Id. at 693.
41. Graves, 656 N.W.2d at 202 (emphasis added).
42. Id.
43. Supra note 34 and accompanying text.
44. Sanders, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1274.
45. James, 300 F.3d at 699.
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consideration of the importance of speech in a free society on the duty
analysis thus is another effective line of defense against negligence
theories. The same First Amendment concerns that underlie the
Brandenburg test to preclude liability under the incitement-to-violence
standard can be used to crush liability under a negligence theory on the
very first element of duty.
In summary, the four cases described above collectively suggest little
hope for plaintiffs on negligence and products liability theories, while
indicating the continuing effectiveness of the Brandenburg standard for
defendants. But is all hope lost for plaintiffs? The next part addresses that
issue.
IV. THE MEANING OF THE CASES FOR FUTURE PLAINTIFFS
The second issue raised by these four cases, as set forth earlier, is
whether they send a clear signal to plaintiffs' attorneys that the future of
litigation against the manufacturers and producers of media products is
bleak.46 Parsed differently and more bluntly, Is all hope lost for plaintiffs
when media products allegedly cause violent and unlawful acts?
The obvious answer is 'yes,' at least in cases involving similar factual
circumstances, since the plaintiffs lost in each case, regardless of the theory
under which relief was sought. Rex Heinke, a media defense attorney who
participated in the 2002 Symposium, said the recent cases described in Part
II collectively suggest that "these claims simply aren't going to succeed.
It's hard to imagine a situation in which they would work. '' 7
But there may still be hope for plaintiffs outside of traditional tort
theories like negligence and strict products liability. During last year's
Entertainment Law Symposium, Professor Rodney Smolla proposed and
articulated a new cause of action that "is an amalgam of tort principles and
First Amendment principles, but not, as you would guess, principles
emanating from Brandenburg v. Ohio.' ,s In particular, the Smolla-created
cause of action borrows from the United State Supreme Court's 1964 New
York Times v. Sullivan49 opinion and the actual malice standard adopted
therein.5° Smolla's cause of action takes the recklessness component of
46. Supra note 34 and accompanying text.
47. Telephone conversation with Rex Heinke, Esq., Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld,
LLP, Los Angeles, Cal. (Dec. 13, 2002) (notes on file with author).
48. Dougherty, supra note 1, at 239.
49. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
50. Id. at 279-80 (defining "actual malice" as meaning made "with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.").
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actual malice to fashion a theory that takes an intermediate-level approach
between the high standard of Brandenburg and the "low-level
negligence" 5 1 standard. Under this theory, the issue becomes whether the
defendants "acted with reckless indifference to human life.
' 52
Although it is still inchoate, perhaps it is now time for plaintiffs'
attorneys to develop and try out a new theory of liability that borrows from
the one proposed at last year's symposium by Professor Smolla. Given
both Smolla's success with an alternative theory-aiding and abetting, in
Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc. 53 -and the negative results for plaintiffs
in each of the four recent cases described in this article, it certainly is worth
a shot.
V. PLAINTIFFS AND THE SEARCH FOR SILVER LININGS
From a plaintiffs perspective, there may be one silver lining found
among the analyses of the cases set forth above in Parts II and III. It is that
there may be some video games that are not protected by the First
Amendment-based Brandenburg v. Ohio5 4 standard because those games
lack a necessary speech component. In particular, in Wilson v. Midway
Games, Inc., 55 Judge Janet Bond Atherton wrote that "the label 'video
game' is not talismanic, automatically making the object to which it is
applied either speech or not speech. 56 She reasoned that "video games
that are merely digitized pinball machines are not protected speech., 57 And
in James v. Meow Media, Inc., the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote
that its "decision here today should not be interpreted as a broad holding on
the protected status of video games."
'5 9
Couple these statements from Wilson and James with Judge Posner's
dictum a year earlier in American Amusement Machine Ass 'n v. Kendrick6°
that regulations on video games might be permissible "if the games lacked
any story line and were merely animated shooting galleries, 6 1 and Federal
Judge Stephen Limbaugh's opinion in April 2002 that video games are not
51. Dougherty, supra note 1, at 240.
52. Id. at 239.
53. 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
54. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
55. 198 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D. Conn. 2002).
56. Id. at 181.
57. Id.
58. 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002).
59. Id. at 696 (emphasis added).
60. 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 994 (2001).
61. Id. at 579.
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a form of speech protected by the First Amendment, 62 and it becomes
evident that lawsuits against the manufacturers of at least some video
games may still be viable.
To squeeze through this apparent hole in the wall of First Amendment
protection, plaintiffs' attorneys would need to launch a successful argument
that the particular video game at issue in a particular case, but not all video
games generally, lacks a plot, storyline, or otherwise identifiable speech
component. Arguments that video games as a general category or form of
media product lack First Amendment protection will not suffice.
VI. CONCLUSION
Setting aside the rigid application of the tort standards of negligence
and strict products liability, as well as the First Amendment's incitement-
to-violence test, Could there be other more subtle societal forces at work
that helped direct the courts to the results in this quartet of cases? Could it
be that since the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11,
2001, there is recognition that the forces that cause violence are far more
complex than any message a movie, video game, or Web site could ever
convey? Or could it be that the tragedy simply points out the reality that
controlling violent forces through the regulation of media products is a
futile endeavor?
The journalistic reaction to these decisions, not surprisingly, was
decidedly upbeat. The Denver Post, lauding Judge Babcock's decision to
dismiss the case in the Columbine shootings, wrote an editorial that could
have been drawn from the closing argument of a media defense attorney.63
"Judge Babcock has sealed the lid on a can of worms that shouldn't be
opened, however great the grief of Columbine families may be," the
newspaper opined.64 An alternative ruling, the paper argued with a classic
floodgates and parade-of-horrors logic, "would have opened the door to
claiming that almost any created work that contains violence can cause
criminal acts by third parties. 65
The Post certainly has it right, at least from the perspective of the
producers and distributors of media products. And the growing weight of
judicial authority from the four cases set forth in Part II would concur.
Plaintiffs will need to test new theories of liability-perhaps variations and
62. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1135
(E.D. Mo. 2002).
63. Editorial: Ending the Blame Game, DENVER POST, Mar. 6, 2002, at B6.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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versions of the one proposed by Professor Smolla at the 2002
Entertainment Law Symposium 66 -if they want success in the future.
66. Supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.

